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Abstract
News utility is the idea that the utility of an agent also depends on changes in
her beliefs over consumption and money. We introduce news utility into otherwise
classical static Bayesian mechanism design models. We show that a key role is
played by the timeline of the mechanism, i.e. whether there are delays between the
announcement stage, the participation stage, the play stage and the realization stage
of a mechanism. Depending on the timing, agents with news utility can experience
two additional news utility effects: a surprise effect derived from comparing to pre-
mechanism beliefs, as well as a realization effect derived from comparing post-play
beliefs with the actual outcome of the mechanism.
We look at two distinct mechanism design settings reflecting the two main
strands of the classical literature. In the first model, a monopolist screens an agent
according to the magnitude of her loss aversion. In the second model, we consider
a general multi-agent Bayesian mechanism design setting where the uncertainty of
each player stems from not knowing the intrinsic types of the other agents. We give
applications to auctions and public good provision which illustrate how news utility
changes classical results.
For both models we characterize the optimal design of the timeline. A timeline
featuring no delay between participation and play but a delay in realization is never
optimal in either model. In the screening model the optimal timeline is one without
delays. In auction settings, under fairly natural assumptions the optimal timeline
may have delays between all three stages of the mechanism.
1 Introduction
Most situations in practice to which the theory of classical static Bayesian mechanism
design is applicable can be thought of as consisting of three distinct stages: first, the
mechanism is announced to the agents and the agents decide whether to participate;
second, the agents decide what to play in the mechanism and finally, the mechanism
outcome consisting of a consumption allocation and money transfers to the designer is
realized.
Classical models of Bayesian mechanism design generally assume that the agents pos-
sess quasi-linear utility and are Expected Utility maximizers. Absent discounting issues
the analysis is the same in the classical model for the cases where the above mentioned
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stages may happen with delay from each other.1 This is because the agents in the classical
model are time-consistent as well as insensitive to the timing of the realization of uncer-
tainty. This paper characterizes mechanism design for agents who violate the last two
assumptions in a specific way: they experience news utility and loss aversion. These two
features make the agents sensitive to whether uncertainty is resolved with delay and lead
to time-inconsistent behavior. We look at the case of news-utility agents who are sophis-
ticated with regard to this time-inconsistency. These assumptions lead to considerable
differences to classical analysis: besides changes in several key intuitions from classical
settings, the issue of the optimal design of the timeline of the mechanism becomes salient.
More precisely, in this paper we assume agents possess quasi-linear intrinsic utility and
add the innovation that their utilities depend on changes in their beliefs over consumption
and money (henceforth called news utility). News utility is assumed separable in the good
and money dimension and the comparison of new to old beliefs uses a classical gain-loss
function featuring loss aversion (see e.g. [Kahneman, Tversky ’79]) – relative to good
news, utility losses from ‘bad news’ are compounded due to loss aversion. The agents in
this paper are forward-looking with respect to both intrinsic and news utility as well as
sophisticated about their future behavior. We assume news utility is produced only from
objective sources, i.e. there is no self-production of news utility and that each agent takes
into account future news utility in expectation in any decision instance. Just as for the
classical part of the utility, the belief over future consumption and money used to weigh
news utility is induced by an agent’s play and other random factors in the environment.
We consider the consequences of such preferences in two different Bayesian mechanism
design settings reflecting two of the main strands of the classical literature: monopolistic
screening of a single agent as well as multi-agent mechanism design such as auction or
public goods settings. In the screening model we assume the uncertainty facing the mo-
nopolist concerns a behavioral parameter of the agent: her loss aversion level in the good
and money dimension. We also assume that the agent learns her intrinsic type only upon
consumption. This simple model already matches many situations in the real world where
the intrinsic value of a consumption good is discovered only upon consumption. In the
multi-agent model we assume that all ‘behavioral’ features of the preferences are common
knowledge, the agents know their intrinsic type when presented with the mechanism, and
an agent’s uncertainty only comes from not knowing the intrinsic type of the other agents.
Therefore, the informational side of the multi-agent model is a straightforward extension
of the classical multi-agent Bayesian mechanism design model with quasilinear utility,
whose prime examples in the literature are auction settings or provision of public goods.
In stark contrast to the classical setting, with the new preferences it matters whether
there are delays between stages of a mechanism so that we distinguish three main timelines
for the analysis.2
In timeline A, the mechanism is implemented without delay: the announcement of its
existence, the decision to participate and what to play happen almost concurrently so that
1Besides strategic use of delays by a designer, exogenously given delays due to technological constraints
between stages where uncertainty persists in the agents’ minds are a recurrent feature of life: goods need
to be produced, information must travel, etc.
2Additional timelines are equivalent to the ones presented here under two simplifying assumptions:
no-discounting of utility and the the designer cannot randomize. See subsection 1.1 and Proposition 1
for more details. Figure 2 from subsection 2.1 and Figure 3 from subsection 3.1 respectively depict in
detail the timelines for the two different mechanism design models.
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each agent only experiences one bout of news utility (dubbed surprise effect) coming from
comparing the pre-mechanism beliefs in the consumption and money dimensions pinned
down by her outside option with the new (degenerate) beliefs induced by the realization
of the mechanism outcome.
In timeline B the participation and play stages of the mechanism happen without
delay but the mechanism outcome is realized with delay. Besides the surprise effect
the agent experiences now a second bout of news utility coming from comparing the
actual realization of the mechanism outcome with the distribution induced by her play
decision and the environment (dubbed realization effect). She takes this into account in
expectation at the play stage. This results in lower interim utility because of loss aversion:
delaying the outcome after a play decision hurts the agent because bad news hurt more
in expectation than good news elate.
Finally, in timeline C there is a delay between the participation stage and the play
stage, besides the delay between the play stage and the moment the mechanism outcome
is realized. In this case the agent’s time inconsistency becomes observable as different
selves with different objectives decide on participation and play. The play-self doesn’t
take into account the surprise effect of the participation self whereas the latter takes into
account the future behavior of the play-self. This wedge between participation and play
can be fruitfully used by the designer in certain situations as she may be able to exploit the
play-self better once she is locked-in after deciding to take part in the mechanism. This
comes at a cost though: in optimal mechanisms the participation-self, being sophisticated
and anticipating her future decisions, may need to be subsidized in comparison to the
other timelines.
Say that a direct mechanism is incentive compatible if revealing own private informa-
tion is an equilibrium for the respective timeline of the mechanism. Similar to the classical
setting, monotonicity conditions are key in characterizing incentive compatibility and the
resulting expected transfers. But due to news utility, monotonicity applies to modified
interim perceived valuations instead of the interim intrinsic valuations from the classical
setting. As a consequence, incentive compatible allocation rules only determine perceived
expected transfers to the designer, up to type-independent constants.
Say that an incentive compatible mechanism is individually rational if it gives an
equilibrium participation utility higher than the outside option to every agent. Whereas
the same self decides about incentive compatibility and individual rationality whenever
there is no delay between participation and play decisions (timelines A and B), different
selves decide on them when there is a delay between the two decision stages (timeline C).
For allocation rules whose incentive compatibility is unproblematic in the classical
model, loss aversion can lead to failure of incentive compatibility whenever it is high
enough and the timeline features delays. We illustrate this in the case of the ex-post
efficiency rule for public good provision with symmetric agents and private information
concerning the intrinsic type.3 We also show how incentive compatibility may be restored
in that setting under certain conditions on the distribution of the intrinsic valuation of
the public good, whenever the number of agents is high enough. Intuitively, with a large
number of agents the law of large numbers kicks in and the ex-post efficiency rule implies
small news utility costs for delays as the probability of provision becomes either very high
or very low.
3Ex-post efficiency means the designer would like to maximize the welfare of the agents under complete
information.
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For the screening model we show that a timeline without any delays (timeline A) is
optimal whenever the private information of the agent, her loss aversion, is symmetric
across the two dimensions, consumption and money. Furthermore, a timeline without
delays between participation and play decision is always weakly better than one with
delays between the two decision stages (timeline C). This ranking relies on the assumed
symmetry for the loss aversion across dimensions, which implies a relatively small negative
surprise effect in the money dimension at the moment of the participation decision, as
well as on the fact that the subsidy for the individual rationality constraint in timeline C
is non-negligible.
For the multiple agent model where private information concerns intrinsic valuations
we study the optimality of timelines in the case of auctions with symmetric agents. We
show that, analogous to the screening model, timeline B is never optimal as it is dominated
by a timeline A. We show by example that timeline C may be optimal whenever the lowest
intrinsic type is strictly higher than the highest utility of the outside option of an agent.
Intuitively, this is precisely the case when the agent has maximal participation incentives.
This lowers the subsidy needed to overcome the incentive wedge between the participation-
self and the reporting-self. When compared to A, timeline C has an improved incentive
compatibility property due to two effects: 1) the missing negative surprise in the money
dimension, and 2) the designer can condition payments on the uncertainty facing the
agents after their declared type in such a way as to give better incentives for truthtelling.
The second effect is costly for each agent due to loss aversion, but may result in higher
revenue overall due to improved incentive compatibility. Overall, when the loss aversion
in the money is high enough, so that the first effect is strong, timeline C may dominate
a timeline A. In the same example and for the case that loss aversion in the money
dimension is low enough we show that a timeline A may remain optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next subsection we introduce the
model for a single agent which is the building block for both of the mechanism design
models we consider. Subsection 1.2 comments on related literature. Section 2 contains
the one-agent screening model for loss aversion followed by Section 3 which considers
the multi-agent model where agents face uncertainty about the intrinsic types of their
opponents. Proofs for the main results of the paper are relegated in the appendix. The
online appendix comments on the revelation principle in our setting and relaxes the as-
sumption of a degenerate outside option in the money dimension. It also contains several
other applications of the multi-agent model to other classical Bayesian mechanism design
settings.
1.1 Preferences
This subsection explains in detail the preferences and the decision procedure of the agents.
Agents experience intrinsic utility from actual consumption and payments as well as news
utility from changes in beliefs.
Intrinsic utility. The agent derives intrinsic utility from consumption of a profile a
of consumption goods coming from a set of physical allocations A which is a closed,
connected subset of an Euclidean space Rd, d ≥ 1 as well as from a monetary transfer
t. Moreover, the utility of the agent from the pair of consumption goods and monetary
payment (a, t) depends also on a parameter which we call her intrinsic type θ and which
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comes from a closed interval of R denoted Θ = [θ, θ¯]. We assume that intrinsic utility for
each agent with type θ is quasilinear and of the form
V (a, θ, t) = v(a)θ − t. (1)
v : A→R+ is assumed differentiable. Let in the following ∆(A×Θ×R) denote the set of
Borel probability distributions over A×Θ× R.
We assume the agent conforms to Expected Utility in the intrinsic part of her utility.
That is, if the uncertainty over u = (a, θ, t) is captured by a distribution G ∈ ∆(A×Θ×R)
then the agent experiences expected intrinsic utility of the form
Eu∼G[V (u)].
Hereafter, u ∼ G means the random variable u is distributed according to the distribution
G.
News utility. Besides intrinsic utility, the agent experiences news utility whenever her
beliefs about the realization of u objectively change from H to some G ∈ ∆(A×Θ×R).
News utility is experienced in two dimensions: in the consumption dimension (upper index
g in the following, g stands for good), and in the monetary dimension (upper index m in
the following). For any G ∈ ∆(A×Θ×R) denote by Gg the distribution of v(a)θ induced
by G. This depends only on the marginal distribution of G on A × Θ. Moreover, let
Gm be the marginal distribution of G on the monetary payments. Whenever the agent’s
belief changes from G to H she experiences news utility in the dimension j = g,m given
by
N j(Gj|Hj) = µj
∫ 1
0
ξj(cGj(p)− cHj(p))dp.
Here for any real-valued distribution F , cF (p) is the p-percentile of F , p ∈ (0, 1).4 More-
over,
ξj(y) =
{
y if y ≥ 0
λjy if y < 0
(2)
is a value function of Kahneman-Tversky type ([Kahneman, Tversky ’79]).5 Here λj > 1
is the loss aversion parameter of the agent in the dimension j. A negative change causes
the agent to experience a disutility greater in magnitude than the elation caused by a
positive change of the same size.
µj > 0 is the agent’s relative weight on the news utility in dimension j. Overall, news
utility of the change from H to G is given through the sum of the news utilities of the
two dimensions.
N (G|H) = N g(Gg|Hg) +Nm(Gm|Hm).
The timelines we have in mind are the following. First, the agent is offered a menu of
lotteries C which is a subset of ∆(A×Θ×R). We assume this is a non-empty compact set
4For any p ∈ (0, 1) the p-percentile cF (p) of F is determined by the conditions F (cF (p)) ≥ p and
F (c) < p for any c < cF (p).
5This percentile-per-percentile comparison first appeared in [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’09]. See [Pagel ’17] for
alternative specifications of the news utility which can incorporate correlation between dimensions.
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of ∆(A× Θ× R) where we have equipped the latter with topology of weak convergence
of probability measures (this fits both mechanism design models below). Then she picks
a lottery from C and finally the outcome of the lottery is realized. There may exist delays
between the moment the menu C is offered to the agent and the moment she chooses from
C as well as the moment the uncertainty from the lottery she picked from C is realized.
These delays may be due to technological constraints or they may be introduced through
the outside party, call it designer, which designs the menu C.6 7 We assume that there is
no discounting of time whenever a delay is present.8
The timelines the agent may face depending on the timing of delays are depicted in
Figure 1.9
A
D
C
B
Accept or
decline M
Choice 
from M 
(if accept)
Uncertainty is
realized
delay
delaydelay
delay
Accept or
decline M
Uncertainty is
realized
Choice 
from M 
(if accept)
Choice 
from M 
(if accept)
Choice 
from M 
(if accept)
Accept or
decline M
Accept or
decline M
Uncertainty is
realized
Uncertainty is
realized
Figure 1: Different timelines.
In the following we also assume that the agent has an exogenously given belief over
A× Θ × R given by F0. This is what she expects to happen if she is not notified of the
option of choosing from C. In mechanism design settings below F0 is determined by the
outside option of the agent.
To calculate the overall utility of an agent we impose the following assumptions on
the agent’s behavior.
Assumption 1: The agent is sophisticated, Bayesian and forward-looking. That is,
she takes into account the optimal behavior of future selves, uses Bayes rule to update
6Some typical examples of technological constraints comprise settings where communication takes
time or where delivery of payments/goods or production of a good whose consumption value is uncertain
takes time.
7In the mechanism design settings we consider not every menu C out of ∆(A×Θ× R) is feasible. In
particular, we don’t allow the designer to randomize so that the subjective randomness the agents face
is only due to the environment.
8It is not hard to introduce discounting to the model but discounting doesn’t yield any additional
deep insight besides making the model much more cumbersome.
9Additional timelines featuring delay between the announcement of the existence of C and the moment
the agent is required to decide on whether to accept C or not are equivalent to existing ones under the no-
discounting assumption by the same argument as we show for timelines C and D below (see Proposition
1). Those timelines would be relevant in a model of ‘deciding when to decide’ which is outside the scope
of this paper.
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beliefs whenever possible and is indifferent to the welfare of past selves.
This means that when deciding whether to accept the menu C the agent takes into account
the actual choice she will make from C. Moreover, at each decision moment after a delay
no past intrinsic or news utility is taken into account. We note here that Assumption
1 doesn’t necessarily imply a temporal coordination of selves in the sense that the self
picking from C needs to break ties in favor of the self who decides to accept or reject C.10
Assumption 2: News utility is produced only from objective sources, that is, there is
no self-production of news utility. In particular, the agent conforms with Expected Utility
at each moment in time with respect to any subjective randomization device.11
Under this assumption it is unproblematic to assume that the agent doesn’t possess a
randomization device when picking from C.
Assumption 3: At any moment in time, if no delay is present there is at most one new
news utility term. It comes from comparing beliefs before an objective source of news
with those after the objective source of news.
Assumptions 2 and 3 imply that there are at most two instances of production of news
utility in the above timelines:
1) when the menu C is presented to the agent if she decides to accept it (surprise
effect), as well as
2) when the uncertainty of the lottery she picked from the menu is realized (realization
effect).
Assume the agent ultimately chooses F ∈ C. Then the surprise effect in timelines
B,C,D corresponds to experiencing N (F |F0). The realization effect for timelines B,C and
D corresponds to experiencing N (u|F ) whenever u ∈ A×Θ× R is the realization of F .
In timeline A the two news utility effects coincide and there is only one news utility
term comprised of N (u|F0) whenever u ∈ A×Θ×R is realized. This is because timeline
A stands for the case where the decisions of whether to accept C, what lottery to pick out
of C and the realization of the resulting uncertainty all happen without delay and almost
concurrently.
Assumption 4: Each agent in a decision moment takes into account future news util-
ity terms in expectation by weighting them with the belief induced by her actual decision
be it a decision on or off -equilibrium path.12
This implies for an agent in timelines B,C,D who accepted the menu C, that the expec-
tation of her news utility from the realization effect whenever she picks F ∈ C is given by
Eu∼F [N (u|F )]. We call such a term an expected news utility term.
10An idea of coordination among selves to give a past self a higher utility underlies the PPE concept
in [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’06].
11The related PPE concept used in [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’06] (see also [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’09]) to model agents
who experience expectation-based loss aversion allows for the possibility of self-production of news utility
and therefore adds an additional constraint to the maximization problem of the agent. This may lead to
existence and characterization problems (see [Ko¨szegi ’10]). These are excluded by our assumptions.
12Just as in the case of Assumption 2 this is in stark difference to the PPE solution concept in
[Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’06] and [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’09].
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Decision procedure of a single agent. In timeline A the expected news utility from
accepting the menu C and choosing F ∈ C enters the overall decision utility of the agent
as Eu∼F [N (u|F0)].
For the case that the agent doesn’t accept menu C she experiences utility
O(F0) = Eu∼F0 [V (u)] + Eu∼F0 [N (u|F0)],
regardless of whether the realization of F0 happens with a delay or not.
13 14 For the case
that F0 is degenerate, say puts probability one on u0, we have O(F0) = V (u0).
Whenever the agent accepts the menu, she experiences in timeline A the decision
utility
max
F∈C
Eu∼F [V (u)] + Eu∼F [N (u|F0)].
She accepts C if and only if this utility is higher than O(F0).
In timeline B she accepts C if and only if her decision utility from C given by
max
F∈C
Eu∼F [V (u)] + Eu∼F [N (u|F0)] + Eu∼F [N (u|F )] (3)
is higher than O(F0). She then picks an F from C where the maximum is attained.
In timelines C and D different selves of the agent with distinct perspectives decide on
whether C should be accepted and then on the lottery picked out of C. For the case that
the agent has accepted C her decision utility from choosing out of C is
max
F∈C
Eu∼F [V (u)] + Eu∼F [N (u|F )].
Being sophisticated, she then accepts C if and only if her decision utility Eu∼F [V (u)]+
Eu∼F [N (u|F0)] + Eu∼F [N (u|F )], evaluated at the F she expects to choose out of C, is
higher than O(F0). If there are multiple F ∈ C which are optimal we assume she breaks
ties deterministically and that her self at the moment of deciding whether to accept C
anticipates the tie-breaking correctly. This is in line with Assumption 1 above.
Formally, we assume the following condition about possible tie-breaking.
Deterministic tie-breaking. Whenever the agent is indifferent between accepting C
and rejecting, she accepts it. Whenever the agent is indifferent between distinct elements
of C at the choice-out-of-menu stage she breaks ties deterministically.15 16
Our Assumptions together with deterministic tie-breaking ensure a full characterization
of behavior. It is easy to see that the behavior in timeline D is the same as in timeline
C. The following Proposition registers this property as well as another simple one which
has important consequences in mechanism design settings.
13O stands for outside option.
14She experiences only one news utility term given by N (u|F0) whenever u is realized and takes ex-
pectation of it by weighting with F0. This is because F0 is not a surprise, i.e. it is expected by the agent
at the beginning of time.
15Deterministic tie-breaking is in line with Assumption 2 above. We assume it here so that we can
focus on the behavioral features of the model rather than technicalities.
16All settings considered in this paper correspond to menus whose elements are parametrized through
a compact one-dimensional interval so that it is easy to write down deterministic tie-breaking rules.
8
Proposition 1. 1) Expected news utility terms of the form Eu∼F [N (u|F )] are non-positive
and vanish if and only if F puts unit mass on a single element u0.
2) The behavior of the agent is the same in timelines C and D.
The proof of the equivalence of C and D is contained in the text above. It relies
crucially on the no-discounting assumption as well as on Assumption 2.17 Part 1) is an
implication of loss aversion. Because of loss aversion percentile comparisons between the
realized u and the percentiles of the ‘reference’ distribution F are weighted asymmetrically
depending on whether they correspond to a loss or gain; losses in the dimension j get a
weight of µjλj whereas gains only of µj in units of intrinsic utility. Averaging out across
realizations of u results in a negative expected news utility effect.
Due to Proposition 1 we identify timelines C and D in the rest of the paper.
1.2 Related Literature
This paper connects to different strands of the mechanism design literature as well as of
the applied behavioral literature. The focus on optimal timeline choice for preferences
which are sensitive to the timing of announcements and additionally feature loss aversion
seems new in the literature.
[Ely et al. ’15] analyzes the optimal way to disclose information to an agent whose
preferences depend on the path of the belief change. In their model the agent has pref-
erence for late resolution of uncertainty as she likes to experience suspense and surprise.
In our model the agent exhibits preference for early resolution of uncertainty due to loss
aversion. Moreover, the goal of the designer in [Ely et al. ’15] is to maximize welfare of
the agent whereas we focus on profit maximization. Finally, their model features a fixed
timeline whereas we also study the optimal choice of the timeline in our model.
There are by now several screening models where sophisticated agents exhibit loss-
aversion. [Carbajal, Ely ’14] proposes a screening model of reference dependent and loss
averse consumers where the reference point is non-stochastic and depends linearly on
the private information of the consumer. [Hahn et al. ’18] consider price discrimination
with loss-averse consumers. Similar to the model proposed in Section 2 they assume the
buyers don’t know their intrinsic valuation at the moment they face the menu of bundles
the monopolist offers. They assume that the reference point is the menu of bundles
the monopolist offers and work with ex-post participation and incentive compatibility
constraints. Loss aversion parameters are known by the monopolist in their model. Our
model assumes the monopolist has imperfect information about loss aversion parameters.
Moreover, our model introduces and studies the issue of designing the optimal screening
timeline which is missing from both papers mentioned.
The applied behavioral literature offers several models where a designer, say a mo-
nopolist or a firm in a competitive market, screens on behavioral features of the agents.
[Eliaz, Spiegler ’06] and [Eliaz, Spiegler ’08] consider a designer who faces agents who may
hold potentially incorrect beliefs about their future utility and screens respectively on the
level of sophistication or on the level of optimism of the agent. [Heidhues, Ko¨szegi ’17]
offer a related model and study welfare consequences of screening for the sophistication
17In the mechanism design settings below there is no uniform result as to which of timelines C,D is
better once discounting is allowed. Intuitively, discounting applies in timeline C to both intrinsic utility
and news utility at the choice-from-menu stage whereas it applies to neither in timeline D.
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level of agents. [Heidhues, Ko¨szegi ’10] and [Englmaier et al ’17] offer models in various
settings where a designer screens agents according to their present-bias level. In all of
these models one of the main reasons the agents are dynamically inconsistent is that they
may be naive about their future behavior whereas in our paper the agent is sophisticated
and dynamic inconsistency arises directly from an agent’s preferences and not through
incorrect beliefs about future behavior.
[Heidhues, Ko¨szegi ’14] considers a monopolistic setting where there is complete in-
formation about agent’s preferences, but the monopolist can commit to draw the price
from an ex-ante designed and announced distribution: in period 1 the agent observes the
price distribution and forms expectations, while in period 2 it observes the drawn price
and decides whether to buy or not. The optimal price distribution is non-degenerate. In
contrast, in this paper the designer is assumed to reveal all details of the mechanism in a
single step at the beginning of the game and we work with interim (as opposed to ex-post)
participation constraints.18 Nevertheless, since in our multi-agent model uncertainty per-
sists even with deterministic mechanisms, we get a related result to theirs in our setting:
it may be optimal for the designer to not insure the agent against future uncertainty.
Finally, we stress that their paper focuses on PPE types of equilibria which can’t arise in
this paper.
To the best of our knowledge, [Eisenhuth ’17] is the first paper considering a full-
fledged mechanism design model of auctions with preferences which exhibit expectation-
based loss aversion. He uses the equilibrium concept from [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’07] (CPE)
and solves for the optimal symmetric auction with symmetric bidders. His environment
is most similar to timeline B in this paper.19 [Herweg et al. ’10] introduce the same CPE
preferences in the classical principal-agent model with moral hazard and show how the
optimal contract is much simpler than in the classical model. In a new paper, [Benkert’ 17]
considers the optimal mechanism problem for the bilateral trade model where both buyer
and seller behave according to CPE. He solves for the optimal mechanisms for a special
distribution of types. Within the same timeline our paper additionally looks at other
topics from classical Bayesian mechanism design: auctions, public goods. Moreover, we
also address the issue of the optimal timing of the realization of the mechanism, which
doesn’t occur in either of the above-mentioned works.
This paper contributes to the emerging literature on strategic interaction of agents
whose utility depends on their beliefs about present and future consumption and money
transfers. Relatedly, [Dato et al. ’17] characterize existence properties of strategic equi-
librium based on the preferences of [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’06] (their PE and PPE concepts) and
[Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’07] (their CPE concept) in finite normal-form games and focus mostly
on existence and uniqueness as well as characterizing when equilibrium play is the same
under classical and expectation-based loss averse preferences. The fact that ex-post effi-
ciency in the public goods setting with timelines B,C,D may fail incentive compatibility
(see subsection 3.2.1) is a reflection of the same non-existence phenomenon they identify
18In fact, the result in [Heidhues, Ko¨szegi ’14] ceases to hold if the agent is given the chance to decide
about the purchase before seeing the distribution of prices in period 1. Ex-post participation constraints
are less appropriate in settings where the value of the product to the consumer is revealed only upon
consumption and the agent can commit to the mechanism before consumption.
19Similarly to our results in the online appendix [Eisenhuth ’17] establishes that optimal auctions for
CPE preferences are all-pay with a reference price. He also considers a model of wide-bracketing, which is
assumed away in our model due to the separability assumption across the two dimensions, consumption
and money.
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in their model.
2 A screening model of loss aversion
This section offers a tractable model of screening with news utility agents whose private
information concerns their loss aversion parameters. Naturally, assuming that private
information of an agent includes multiple parameters of her behavioral preferences leads
to a multidimensional screening problem. Here we avoid the technical difficulties of mul-
tidimensional mechanism design by assuming symmetry for loss aversion in the money
and good dimension and that the designer knows all news utility parameters but one: the
loss aversion parameter. We focus on a model of monopolistic screening where the buyers
don’t know the realization of their intrinsic utility at the moment of participation decision
and choice of contract.20
Real life settings approximated by this model would be buying tickets to a concert
from an unknown band, buying a book from an unknown author, or vacationing in an
unknown destination, etc.
2.1 Set Up
We assume the designer is a monopolist producing non-negative quantities of a good
denoted by q at a fixed marginal cost c > 0.21 A buyer has intrinsic utility from a
contract (q, t) of the form
v(q)θ − t.
Here θ is the intrinsic value of the good. v fulfills standard assumptions: v(0) = 0, v ≥
0, v′ > 0, v′′ < 0 and limx→0 v′(x) = +∞. Moreover, for purely technical reasons we
additionally require a weak growth condition on v: there exists some p > 1 so that it
holds v′(x) ≥ K
vp−1(x) for some K > 0.
22
Figure 2 below depicts the relevant timelines with news utility. We assume the timeline
T ∈ {A,B,C} is either given through technological constraints or it is chosen by the
designer. The informational assumptions of the screening model are as follows.
Assumption (S) Intrinsic utility θ is distributed according to a probability distribution
F with bounded support over the non-negative numbers. F is common knowledge and it
fulfills m := Eθ∼F [θ] > 0 (on average the good yields positive intrinsic utility). All buyers
put weight µg = µm = 1 on news utility and have λg = λm = λ. The distribution of λ has
a continuously differentiable and strictly positive density g on [1, λ¯] (2 ≥ λ¯ > 1) and its
c.d.f. G is common knowledge.23
20It is possible to construct a more complicated model with signals which partly reveal the incomplete
information about θ after or before the contract is signed. If the signals are public knowledge however,
the more general case is easily reduced to a model similar to the one in this section.
21This can be relaxed to a weakly increasing marginal cost c and none of the results would qualitatively
change. We keep a constant marginal cost throughout for ease of exposition.
22This weak condition is crucial for our proof of existence of an optimal mechanism in timeline C. It
says that the marginal utility v′ doesn’t fall too fast with x.
23As [Masatlioglu, Raymond ’16] establish, λ ≤ 2 is a necessary requirement for the preferences of
the agent to respect first-order stochastic monotonicity in the money dimension. They don’t consider
different timelines as here but their results about choice over monetary lotteries still hold qualitatively
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Figure 2: Relevant timelines for the monopolistic screening model.
Denote for future reference M := Eθ,s∼F [(θ − s)1{θ≥s}]. It is easy to see that M < m.
The outside option which determines the pre-mechanism beliefs of each buyer type
consists of a zero utility: zero amount of good and zero transfers to the designer are
expected in the absence of any mechanism.
We focus in this section on the case of deterministic mechanisms, i.e. we assume for
simplicity in exposition that the monopolist doesn’t possess a randomization device. We
comment in the end of this section on how the results change with randomized mecha-
nisms.
Mechanisms consist of menus C = {(q(λ), t(λ))}λ∈[1,λ¯] the monopolist offers. This is
a set of contracts indexed by loss aversion specifying the quantity of the good q and the
price of that good at that quantity. In the framework of subsection 1.1 the buyers are
agents facing a menu of lotteries over ∆([0,∞) × Θ × R) with the property that the
marginals over the quantity q and payment t are degenerate. The lotteries in the menu
are indexed by λ ∈ [1, λ¯].
In the remaining part of this section we characterize individual rationality and incen-
tive compatibility for all timelines and finally look at the optimal timeline choice for the
designer.
2.2 Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
2.2.1 Incentive Compatibility
Timeline A: It is without loss of generality for optimal mechanisms to consider only
payment schedules t ≥ 0.
If the agent has decided to participate and choose bundle (q(λˆ), t(λˆ)) then the news
in our setting of timelines B,C (and therefore also D).
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utility from the comparison with the pre-mechanism expectations is given by
v(q(λˆ))m− λt(λˆ). (4)
She also experiences consumption utility v(q(λˆ))θ − t(λˆ), which at the decision moment
is in expected utility terms
v(q(λˆ))m− t(λˆ).
Gathering the terms together, we see that utility of a buyer of type λ from declaring λˆ is
2mv(q(λˆ))− (1 + λ)t(λˆ).
Denote
ΓA(λ) =
2m
1 + λ
. (5)
We call ΓA(λ) the A-virtual type of the buyer. The term in the denominator reflects
the negative surprise effect in the money dimension. The numerator reflects the surprise
effect in the good dimension. The A-virtual type is a decreasing function of the agent’s
loss aversion parameter.
Incentive compatibility is characterized by
arg max
λˆ∈[1,λ¯]
{
(1 + λ)
[
ΓA(λ)v(q(λˆ))− t(λˆ)
]}
= λ.
Timeline B: Again it is without loss of generality for optimal mechanisms to consider
only payment schedules t ≥ 0.
In this timeline if the buyer of type λ has decided to choose bundle (q(λˆ), t(λˆ)), she will
first experience news utility from the comparison with the pre-mechanism expectations
just as in timeline A.
When the buyer learns her draw of the material valuation θ she experiences news
utility in the good dimension from comparing the outcome to her previous belief v(q(λˆ))s
where s is distributed according to F :
v(q(λˆ))
∫
(θ − s)1{θ≥s} + λ(θ − s)1{θ<s}F (ds).
Due to the delay, she takes the expectation of this expression w.r.t. θ at the moment she
decides whether to participate or not, so that her expected news utility from realization
is given by the following expression
(1− λ)Mv(q(λˆ)).
There is no news utility term in the money dimension when θ is revealed as there is no
uncertainty in the money dimension once a bundle has been chosen by the agent.
Taking into account the expectation of the intrinsic utility v(q(λˆ))θ− t(λˆ) we see that
decision utility of a buyer of type λ from choosing the contract corresponding to λˆ is
[2m+ (1− λ)M ] v(q(λˆ))− (1 + λ)t(λˆ)
Denote
ΓB(λ) =
2m+ (1− λ)M
1 + λ
.
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We call this the B-virtual type of the agent. It is a decreasing function of her loss aversion
parameter. The denominator reflects the surprise effect in the money dimension while the
numerator reflects both the surprise as-well-as the realization effect in the consumption
dimension.
Incentive Compatibility is characterized by
arg max
λˆ∈[1,λ¯]
{
(1 + λ)
[
ΓB(λ)v(q(λˆ))− t(λˆ)
]}
= λ.
Timeline C. At the moment of contract choice the agent experiences no surprise effect
as the contract doesn’t constitute news anymore but she still takes into account the
realization effect in expectation. Given this, Incentive Compatibility is characterized by
arg max
λˆ∈[1,λ¯]
{
[m+ (1− λ)M ]v(q(λˆ))− t(λˆ)
}
= λ.
Denote ΓC(λ) = m+(1−λ)M the C-virtual type. It includes the expected future news
utility from the realization of the mechanism as well as the expected value of consumption.
It is decreasing in the loss aversion parameter λ.
Standard methods yield then the following characterization of incentive compatible
mechanisms. Here we call an allocation rule q : [1, λ¯]→R+ is implementable if there exists
an incentive compatible mechanism C with allocation rule q.
Proposition 2. 1) An allocation rule q : [1, λ¯]→R+ is implementable if and only if q(·)
is non-increasing.
2) (Mirrlees Representation) For any implementable q the corresponding payments
t : [1, λ¯]→R are given up to a type-independent constant by the following Mirrlees repre-
sentations.
(A) tA(s) = ΓA(s)v(q(s))− 2m
∫ λ¯
s
v(q(t))
(1 + t)2
dt,
(B) tB(s) = ΓB(s)v(q(s))− 2(m+M)
∫ λ¯
s
v(q(t))
(1 + t)2
dt,
(C) tC(s) = ΓC(s)v(q(s)) +M
∫ s
1
v(q(σ))dσ.
The type-independent constant not depicted in part 2) of the Proposition is a fixed
payment to the monopolist (or transfer to the agents) which is independent of the pri-
vate information of the agents. In an optimal mechanism its value is determined by the
individual rationality requirement.
2.2.2 Individual Rationality
The following Proposition gives the individual rationality characterization for incentive
compatible mechanisms where the payment schedules t are non-negative.24
Proposition 3. Fix a timeline T ∈ {A,B,C}. An incentive compatible contract C =
{(q(λ), tT (λ))}λ∈[1,λ¯] is individually rational for timeline T if the following respective sets
of inequalities are satisfied.
24This is without loss of generality for optimal mechanisms as we show in the appendix.
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• For timelines T = A,B
ΓT (λ)v(q(λ))− tT (λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ [1, λ¯].
• For timeline C
ΓB(λ)v(q(λ))− tC(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ [1, λ¯].
The expressions for timelines A, B are similar to ones from classical models except for
the fact that one has to use modified virtual types which take into account news utility
effects.
For timeline C, at the participation stage the agent anticipates that she’ll be truthful
later, if she accepts an incentive compatible menu C. In all incentive compatible mecha-
nisms in timeline C the payment schedule t(λ) is weakly decreasing in λ.25 Given this, and
the fact that the monopolist can always offer the bundle (0, 0) to any type it follows that
the optimal contract will never feature a net subsidy t(λ) < 0 for any type λ ∈ [1, λ¯].26
It follows that in case of acceptance her utility if she is of type λ is given by
V (λ) = [2m+ (1− λ)M ] v(q(λ))− (1 + λ)t(λ).
Namely, the agent experiences the following utility items: news utility from accepting the
mechanism, intrinsic expected utility from future consumption and finally expected future
news utility from the realization effect.
We show in the appendix that V (λ) can be rewritten as
V (λ) = (1 + λ)
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))− (1 + λ)f − (1 + λ)M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds.
where f is a type-independent payment. The individual rationality requirement can then
be written as
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))− f −M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds ≥ 0, λ ∈ [1, λ¯].
The fact that different selves decide on participation and bundle choice creates a
‘wedge’ between individual rationality and incentive compatibility requirement. A mea-
sure for this discrepancy is precisely the multiplicative factor appearing in the individual
rationality constraint:
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ) = (1− λ)m+ (λ
2 − λ)M
1 + λ
.
2.3 Optimal screening mechanisms and optimal timeline choice
We consider the timelines one after the other.27 Finally, for the case that the monopolist
can pick the timeline we establish general results about the optimality of the timeline.
25This follows immediately from the Mirrlees representation coupled with the envelope theorem.
26If this were not true then it would hold t(λ0) < 0 for every λ0 > λ. Going over to t(λ0) = 0 and
q(λ0) = 0 for all λ0 ≥ λ preserves incentive compatibility but increases profits.
27Establishing the existence of an optimal mechanism in timelines A and B uses classical methods of
pointwise maximization whereas the problem in timeline C can be rewritten into a calculus of variations
problem with constraints for which we show existence of a solution and give a recipe in the online appendix
on how to find it in many typical examples.
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Timeline A. We establish in the appendix that the profit function for an incentive
compatible and individually rational menu of contracts for timeline A looks as follows.
ΠA =
∫ λ¯
1
[
ΨA(s)v(q(s))− cq(s)]G(ds), (6)
with
ΨA(s) = ΓA(s)− 2m G(s)
(1 + s)2g(s)
.
ΨA(s) is the virtual valuation for timeline A. The virtual type ΓA(s) is corrected for
the informational rent of the agent represented here by 2m G(s)
(1+s)2g(s)
.
The monopolist problem is thus maximizing (6) under the constraint that q be non-
increasing and that individual rationality is fulfilled.
We give a specific example of the solution for timeline A.
Example 1. Assume
G = uniform([1, 2]).
We take F = uniform([0, 1]) i.e. the intrinsic valuations are uniformly distributed
over the interval [0, 1]. Finally, intrinsic utility is given by v(q) =
√
q. The virtual
valuation is calculated to be
ΨA(s) =
2
(1 + s)2
, s ∈ [1, 2].28
The optimal allocation rule is
qA(λ) =
ΨA(λ)2
4c2
.
In particular no type is excluded from the mechanism. One calculates that optimal profit
for timeline A is RA(c) = 65
64·81·c .
Timeline B. The profit function for an incentive compatible and individually rational
mechanism for timeline B looks as follows.
ΠB =
∫ λ0
1
[
ΨB(s)v(q(s))− cq(s)]G(ds), (7)
with
ΨB(s) = ΓB(s)− 2(m+M) G(s)
(1 + s)2g(s)
.
ΨB is the virtual valuation for timeline B. Note that it is weakly lower than the virtual
valuation for timeline A. This is because as noted in Proposition 1 the realization effect
is negative in expectation due to loss aversion. In comparison to timeline A, this results
in a lower virtual type due to lower informational rents.
The problem of the monopolist is maximizing (7) under the constraint that q is non-
increasing and that individual rationality is fulfilled.
28Note that this is always positive and decreasing. There is no need to exclude types of high loss
aversion from the mechanism or to use ironing techniques.
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Timeline C. We show in the appendix that the objective function of the designer can
be written as
ΠC = f ·G(λˆ) +
∫ λˆ
1
{[
ΓC(λ) +M
G(λˆ)−G(λ)
g(λ)
]
v(q(λ))− cq(λ)
}
dG(λ)
for a threshold type λˆ so that (q(λ), t(λ)) = (0, 0) whenever λ ≥ λˆ (exclusion).
Thus the problem of the designer for timeline C is
max
λˆ∈[1,λ¯],f∈R,q(·)
∫ λˆ
1
{[
ΓC(λ) +M
G(λˆ)−G(λ)
g(λ)
+ f
]
v(q(λ))− cq(λ)
}
dG(λ)
s.t.
(1) q(·) is non-increasing,
(2)
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))−M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds ≥ f, λ ∈ [1, λˆ].
(8)
Here ΨC(s, f) = ΓC(s) +M G(λˆ)−G(s)
g(s)
+ f for s ≤ λˆ is the virtual valuation for timeline
B. The virtual type ΓC is again corrected for the information rent and the (net) lump-sum
subsidy f to the participation self. Condition (2) in the above program is just a rewriting
of the individual rationality constraint. f corresponds to a type-independent subsidy
which may need to be paid to ensure individual rationality. This subsidy accounts for the
externality which the self who chooses the bundle exerts on the participation self.
We show that a solution for timeline C always exists. In the online appendix we
also show how to characterize it completely under some regularity requirements which
correspond to a no ironing condition in our setting. The second part of the following
general result has a straightforward proof though.
Proposition 4. 1) There always exists an optimal mechanism for timeline C.
2) If F has support in the non-negative numbers the optimal fixed payment f in an
optimal mechanism for timeline C is negative, whenever profits are positive.
2) implies that in many cases the optimal payment schedule t(·) in timeline C is
discontinuous in λ: high loss aversion types are excluded from the mechanism whereas all
types who are served may receive a fixed, type-independent transfer from the monopolist
to the agents, whenever the monopolist sells some positive amount. Due to the discrepancy
between the self choosing the contract and the self deciding whether to participate the
former self exerts an externality on the latter by disregarding the surprise effect. This
externality can be partially alleviated without adversely affecting incentive compatibility
in the second period by optimally transferring a fixed amount f < 0 to the self at time
zero.
Optimal timeline. Assuming that the monopolist can pick the timeline the following
Theorem is the main result of this subsection.
Theorem 1. For the screening model timeline A is weakly better than timeline B which
is weakly better than timeline C.
17
That timeline A is better than B is a direct consequence of the fact that the virtual
valuation for timeline B given by ΨB in (2.3) is strictly lower than the virtual valuation for
timeline A given by ΨA. Timeline A and B share the surprise effects at the participation
decision moment but the realization effect in the good dimension is absent from timeline
B. This results in an increased willingness to pay for every type when compared to timeline
B.
Intuitively, timeline C may have a more favorable incentive compatibility situation
overall than timeline A since the payments from the buyers are not scaled down by 1 +λ.
The latter happens in timeline A because of the negative surprise effect in the money
dimension. On the other hand, as Proposition 4 shows, whenever employing timeline C
the monopolist has to subsidize participation with a lump-sum payment independent of
types. As it turns out for our specification of the problem this subsidy is too costly even
for small marginal costs c.
The optimality of timeline A relies on two assumptions. First, our Assumption (S)
corresponds to assuming a relatively ‘small’ λmµm in subsection 1.1. This makes for a
small negative surprise effect in the money dimension in timeline A. Second, we have
assumed that the monopolist can not offer stochastic payment schedules t(λ) ∈ ∆(R).
If the latter was possible then the incentive compatibility situation in timeline C is on
one hand better than with deterministic contracts since the monopolist can use type-
dependent lotteries as an additional screening device and on the other hand worse as now
for every type ceteris paribus the perceived payments are higher. We conjecture that
relaxing these two assumptions may result in timeline C optimality in some cases whereas
timeline A still dominates timeline B.29
3 Private information about intrinsic type
In this section we look at multi-agent mechanism design under the assumption that pri-
vate information concerns the intrinsic type of other players. Behavioral parameters of
news utility are common knowledge. For simplicity of exposition we focus on agents
whose intrinsic type spaces are identical. The results about incentive compatibility and
individual rationality can be generalized to asymmetric agents without difficulty.30
3.1 Set Up
We consider a group of agents i = 1, . . . , N who can potentially take part in a mech-
anism. We assume throughout the designer has standard Expected Utility risk neutral
preferences, is interested in revenue maximization and that she has full commitment.
An agent i derives intrinsic utility from consumption of a profile a of consumption
goods coming from a set of allocations A as well as from a (net) monetary transfer to the
principal which is denoted by ti. Formally here A is assumed to be a compact, connected
subset with non-empty interior of RN . We assume that intrinsic utility for each agent i
with type θi is quasilinear and of the form (1). Types are one-dimensional and are given
29Details that timeline A still dominates B when relaxing the two assumptions are available upon
request.
30See online appendix for applications to optimal mechanisms with asymmetric agents and timeline A
in two cases: optimal auctions with asymmetric agents and bilateral trade.
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by the interval Θ = [θ, θ¯] consisting of non-negative numbers. θi is agent i’s (intrinsic)
type and we denote Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×Θn the product of the type spaces.
If the agent doesn’t participate in the mechanism the value of her intrinsic utility in the
allocation dimension is given by a number denoted vi(∅). We require throughout that vi(∅)
is either the maximal or the minimal value that vi can take, i.e. (vi(∅) ∈ {sup vi, inf vi}).31
Moreover, in the money dimension we assume the agent doesn’t expect any transfers in
the absence of the mechanism.32
For the model presented in this section we make the following informational assump-
tion.
Assumption (A): The private information of the agent i consists of θi (her intrinsic
type). The agents know their type at the outset of any interaction with the designer
(interim stage). All agents and the designer have a common knowledge prior for the
type profile (θ1, . . . , θN). The types across agents are i.i.d. and the common marginal
distribution of θi, denoted F , has a continuously differentiable, strictly positive density
f : [θ, θ¯]→R+.
A
D
C
B
Participation
decision
Play
decision
Outcome
announced
Play
decision
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decision
Outcome
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delay
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Figure 3: Timelines for the multiple agent model with uncertainty about intrinsic types.
The timeline of the mechanism is either fixed due to technological constraints or a
choice variable of the designer. In the latter case he declares at the beginning the timeline
he commits to. As established in Proposition 1 the relevant timelines for the analysis are
in Figure 3.
For any fixed timeline the designer can in principle consider arbitrarily complicated
mechanisms. We restrict the analysis without loss of generality to direct mechanisms. For
a given timeline, a direct mechanism asks the agents to report their private information
and assigns as a function of their reports an allocation a from A and (net) transfers ti to
the designer. The restriction to direct mechanisms is justified by the revelation principle.33
31All of our applications both in the main paper as well as in the online appendix fulfill this assumption.
32The online appendix comments on the case of non-trivial outside options in the money dimension.
Incentive compatibility and individual rationality characterizations are similar to the ones in this section.
We focus here on the trivial case for ease of exposition.
33The revelation principle holds true for all models we consider in this section. We establish this fact
in the Online Appendix.
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Formally, a direct mechanism is a mapping which gives for each type report profile
an allocation in A as well as payments from the agents to the designer together with a
timeline T ∈ {A,B,C}. Formally, for any T ∈ {A,B,C} a direct mechanism is a map as
follows.
MT = (q, t1, t2, . . . , tn) : Θ1 × · · · ×Θn→A× Rn. (9)
The uncertainty each agent faces in a given mechanism MT derives only from not
knowing the other agents’ types. In terms of subsection 1.1 we are considering agents
who are offered menus Mi of lotteries over ∆(A×Θ−i×R) parametrized by θi ∈ [θ, θ¯] and
who have to time their decisions according to the timeline T . Given the general form of
mechanisms allowed and the full support assumption on F it is without loss of generality
to assume that the mechanisms are not randomized, i.e. that the designer doesn’t have a
randomization device at her disposal.34
3.2 Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
In the following we take as given a direct mechanism MT as in (9).
Fix an agent i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. For any distribution G ∈ ∆(A×R) giving the distribution
of pairs (a, ti) induced from the play under the mechanism over A × R the marginal of
G over A is denoted by Ga and over ti is denoted by Gt. We call the following term the
news utility of agent i from changing beliefs from H to G when the type of the agent is θi.
Ni(G|H|θi) = µgi
∫ 1
0
ξgi (vi(cGa(p))θi − vi(cHa(p))θi) dp+ µmi
∫ 1
0
ξmi (cHt(p)− cGt(p)) dp.
(10)
Here µgi , µ
m
i , λ
g
i , λ
m
i are the agent-specific behavioral parameters for news utility as in
subsection 1.1. For future reference we also define the aggregate news utility parameters
Λgi = µ
g
i (λ
g
i − 1) and Λmi = µmi (λmi − 1).
Assume that in the mechanism play other agents −i decide to participate and report
their types truthfully to the designer, whereas agent i of type θi decides to report θˆi upon
a positive participation decision. Define Vi(θˆ) as the expected value of vi and Ti(θˆi) the
expected value of ti under these reporting strategies from the perspective of agent i.
35
Finally, define T+i (θˆi) = Eθ−i [max{ti(θˆi, θ−i), 0}], the the expected transfer of type θˆi from
agent i to the designer.
The news utility from the realization effect if the agent decides to participate for the
case vi(∅) = infa∈A vi(a) is
Ni(θˆi|∅|θi) = µgiVi(θˆi)θi − µgi v(∅)θi − µmi Ti(θˆ)− Λmi T+i (θˆ),
whereas for the case vi(∅) = supa∈A vi(a) it is
Ni(θˆi|∅|θi) = λgiµgiVi(θˆi)θi − λgiµgi v(∅)θi − µmi Ti(θˆ)− Λmi T+i (θˆ).
In contrast to the first case of vi(∅) = infa∈A vi(a), in the second case of vi(∅) = supa∈A vi(a)
the utility difference between pre-mechanism belief and post-participation decision is
weighted additionally by λgi . This is because of loss aversion.
34She can use the type draws θ to induce desired distributions on payments.
35Formally, Vi(θˆi) = Eθ−i [q(θˆi, θ−i)] and Ti(θˆi) = Eθ−i [t(θˆi, θ−i)].
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Consider now the news utility from the realization of the outcome of the mechanism
for timelines B and C. If agent i of type θi has reported θˆi and the realized part of the
outcome of the mechanism relevant to agent i is(
q(θˆi, θˆ−i), ti(θˆi, θˆ−i)
)
,
in addition to intrinsic utility she experiences news utility in the good dimension of
µgi
∫
θ−i:vi(q(θˆi,θˆ−i))>vi(q(θˆi,θ−i))
(vi(q(θˆi, θˆ−i))− vi(q(θˆi, θ−i)))dF−i(θ−i)
+ µgiλ
g
i
∫
θ−i:vi(q(θˆi,θˆ−i))<vi(q(θˆi,θ−i))
(vi(q(θˆi, θˆ−i))− vi(q(θˆi, θ−i)))dF−i(θ−i)
(11)
Again, the second summand which is non-positive, is weighted by λgi due to the loss
aversion in the good dimension.
The agent experiences news utility in the money dimension given by
µgi
∫
θ−i:ti(θˆi,θˆ−i)<ti(θˆi,θ−i)
(ti(θˆi, θˆ−i)− ti(θˆi, θ−i))dF−i(θ−i)
− µgiλgi
∫
θ−i:ti(θˆi,θˆ−i)>ti(θˆi,θ−i)
(ti(θˆi, θˆ−i))− ti(θˆi, θ−i))dF−i(θ−i).
(12)
The news utility experienced at the realization moment of the mechanism, denotedNi((θˆi, θˆ−i)|θˆi|θi),
is thus the sum of (11) and (12).
For timelines B and C at the report decision moment the agent takes into account the
news utility from the realization effect in expectation. We show that agent i of type θi
has an overall term of expected realization news utility of
− ΛgiΓgi (θˆi)θi − Λmi ωi(θˆi), (13)
where Γgi (θˆi) and ωi(θˆi) are non-negative. These ‘frictions’ are zero if and only if respec-
tively the allocation q and the transfer ti don’t depend on the realization of the types of
the other players, that is don’t depend on θ−i. The realization effect thus lowers the deci-
sion utility of an agent at the reporting stage. Note that in the screening model of section
2 we only had one such expected news utility term M which was exogenously given. Here
the expected news utility terms Γgi (θˆi) and ωi(θˆi) are influenced by the designer through
the mechanism choice as well as the timeline choice, if the latter is a choice variable. This
additional flexibility has important implications for revenue maximization as we will see.
The following Proposition registers the decision utilities for agents in each of the
participation and reporting stages.
Proposition 5. For the timelines in Figure 3, the decision utilities at the type reporting
stage have a quasilinear, product form. Namely, the utility of agent i of type θi from
reporting type θˆi is of the form
V ti (θˆi|θi) =W ti (θˆi)θi −Υti(θˆi), t = A,B,C. (14)
Depending on the timeline t the functions W ti ,Υti : [θ, θ¯]→R have the following form in
the case vi(∅) = inf vi
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• Timeline A:
WAi (θi) = (1 + µgi )Vi(θi)− µgi v(∅), ΥAi (θi) = (1 + µmi )Ti(θi) + Λmi T+i (θi).
• Timeline B:
WBi (θi) = (1+µgi )Vi(θi)−µgi v(∅)−ΛgiΓgi (θi), ΥBi (θi) = (1+µmi )Ti(θi)+Λmi (T+i (θi)+ωi(θi)).
• Timeline C:
WCi (θi) = Vi(θi)− ΛgiΓgi (θi), ΥCi (θi) = Ti(θi) + Λmi ωi(θi).
For the case vi(∅) = sup vi the only change is in timelines t = A,B where the terms W ti
change into
• Timeline A:
WAi (θi) = (1 + λgiµgi )Vi(θi)− λgiµgi v(∅),
• Timeline B:
WBi (θi) = (1 + λgiµgi )Vi(θi)− λgiµgi v(∅)− ΛgiΓgi (θi).
Note that (14) is reminiscent of the classical utility assumption (1). We name the
termsW ti perceived valuations. In the equilibrium of the mechanism they give the marginal
expected valuation of the allocation for the agent after taking into account news utility
effects, be it the surprise effect (timelines A,B), the realization effect (timelines B,C) or
both (timeline B). When news utility is absent, all perceived valuations W ti are equal to
the expected intrinsic valuation Vi.
We name the terms Υti the perceived transfers. In case news utility is absent, these
terms become equal to the expected interim transfers Ti for all timelines. In the equilib-
rium of the mechanism they give the effect of money transfers on the decision utility in
the type reporting stage after taking into account news utility effects.
With these definitions, classical results help give a full characterization of incentive
compatibility for all timelines.
Proposition 6 (Incentive Compatibility). A direct mechanism M is incentive compat-
ible for the timeline T ∈ {A,B,C} if and only if the perceived valuations WTi are non-
decreasing.
If this is the case, we have the following Mirrlees representation for the interim utility
at the reporting stage VTi (θi) = VTi (θi|θi)
VTi (θi) = VTi (θi|θi) +
∫ θi
θi
WTi (s)ds.
It also holds
ΥTi (θi) =WTi (θi)θi − VTi (θi)−
∫ θi
θi
WTi (s)ds.
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Analogously to the classical case, incentive compatibility is equivalent to a mono-
tonicity condition. Due to news utility effects this monotonicity condition is applied to
perceived valuations instead of expected intrinsic valuations.
We now turn to the individual rationality requirement for incentive compatible mech-
anisms. For all timelines each agent experiences the surprise effect of the mechanism and,
given sophistication, takes into account her own future behavior when deciding to par-
ticipate. In particular, when facing an incentive compatible mechanism she knows she is
going to reveal her true type to the designer at the reporting stage. Under the assumption
that the other agents play truthfully reporting the correct type induces a distribution over
good consumption and money transfers.
We assume the outside option of the mechanism is degenerate: for agent i of type
θi the outside option is vi(∅)θi. The mechanism is individually rational for an agent i
when the equilibrium utility it offers in period one is at least as high as vi(∅)θi for all
types θi ∈ [θ, θ¯]. This equilibrium utility incorporates not only the expected consumption
and transfers from the realization of the mechanism, but also news utility in the form of
the surprise effect for all timelines and in the form of the expected realization effect for
timelines B,C. The following Proposition summarizes this in participation utility formulas.
Proposition 7. (Individual Rationality) An incentive compatible mechanism M is indi-
vidually rational for the respective timelines if the following is fulfilled.
• Timeline A: WAi (θi)θi −ΥAi (θi) ≥ vi(∅)θi, for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
• Timeline B: WBi (θi)θi −ΥBi (θi) ≥ vi(∅)θi, for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
• Timeline C: WBi (θi)θi −ΥBi (θi) ≥ vi(∅)θi, for all θi ∈ [θ, θ¯].
Individual rationality for timelines A and B is equivalent to the requirement that
the equilibrium decision utility in the reporting stage exceeds the value of the outside
option vi(∅)θi. This is because in both of these timelines there is no delay between the
participation decision and the reporting decision. In contrast, in timeline C the reporting
decision doesn’t take into account the bygone surprise effect. The participation self has to
take both news utility effects into account. Therefore the participation decision utilities
are the same as for timeline B, except that the terms Vi, Ti, T
+
i are now determined in the
reporting stage.
3.2.1 Ex-post Efficiency in public good provision
In this subsection we illustrate how loss aversion affects incentive compatibility results
from classical Bayesian mechanism design. Namely, we show how ex-post efficiency in a
symmetric public good provision setting may fail to be incentive compatible, even though
it never does so in the absence of news utility effects. We also illustrate how this issue
may be overcome whenever there are enough players in the game.
Assume a society of N ≥ 2 identical agents whose intrinsic utility of a public good
is private information and is independently and identically distributed according to F
with support [θ, θ] with θ ≥ 0.36 Assume the agents have quasilinear intrinsic utility and
denote by q the probability of provision of the public good: the intrinsic valuation has
36The last requirement means the public good would always be (weakly) desirable if it is implemented
without transfers.
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the form v(q) = q. Let c(N) be the average costs so that providing the public good will
cost to the social planner Nc(N).
Maximizing welfare under complete information and under the assumption that the
social planner has the funds for provision gives the ex-post efficiency rule:
q(θ1, . . . , θn) =
{
1 if (1 + µg)
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ Nc(N)
0 otherwise.
(15)
This is the first-best rule under news utility. Denote by c˜(N) = c(N)
1+µg
, the normalized
per-person provision costs. If an agent is of type θ her interim probability of public good
provision under (15) is Q(θ) = 1− F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N)− θ).37
In the classical setting without news utility and loss aversion ex-post efficiency is
always incentive compatible. This is not always the case in the presence of news utility.38
Proposition 8. Assume (1 + µg)θ < c(N) < (1 + µg)θ¯.
1) Ex-post efficiency is always incentive compatible for timeline A.
If Λg ≤ 1 + µg then ex-post efficiency is incentive compatible for timeline B.
If Λg ≤ 1 then ex-post efficiency is incentive compatible for timeline C.
2) If Λg > 1+µg, it can happen that q is not incentive compatible for timeline B, for ex-
ample if F is concentrated in the vicinity of θ and Nc(N) is big enough. This impossibility
becomes more common with higher loss aversion in the consumption dimension.
The same kind of result holds true for timeline C, if Λg > 1.
3) Let E[F ] be the mathematical expectation of the distribution F .
If θ < lim supn→∞ c˜(N) < E[F ], then q is always incentive compatible whenever N is high
enough with every timeline.
Note that in timeline A the model is isomorphic to a classical quasi-linear model where
the type spaces are [(1 + µg)θ, (1 + µg)θ¯] and the transfers of each agent are scaled down
by 1
1+λmµm
. The same argumenst as in the classical setting deliver all of 1).
The result of part 2) of Proposition 8 for timelines B, C is an instance of equilibrium
non-existence. It is similar to the result in Theorem 1 of [Dato et al. ’17] who show lack
of existence of equilibrium in the related CPE model.39
When N is very large the comparison between average intrinsic valuation E[F ] and
average costs scaled by 1+µg decides on provision. Due to the law of large numbers then,
if the average costs of provision fulfill the inequality in part 3) of the Proposition, the good
is provided with high ex-ante probability so that the expected news utility terms from
the realization effect weigh less on the decision of the agent. This effect helps preserve
incentive compatibility even under relatively high loss aversion.
37Here with F ∗(N) we denote the N -times convolution of a distribution F , i.e. the distribution of the
sum of N i.i.d. draws of F .
38Ex-post efficiency is always incentive compatible with news utility if c(N) ≤ (1 + µg)θ or if c(N) ≥
(1+µg)θ¯. We omit these uninteresting cases and focus on the interesting case (1+µg)θ < c(N) < (1+µg)θ¯
in the following.
39CPE is defined in [Ko¨szegi, Rabin ’07] and has become popular in the applied behavioral literature.
[Masatlioglu, Raymond ’16] show that when CPE is interpreted as a static risk preference it leads to
choice over lotteries which may violate monotonicity with respect to first-order-stochastic-dominance
(FOSD), whenever the loss aversion parameter λm is high enough. Part 2) of the above Proposition is a
result in the same spirit.
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3.3 Optimal Symmetric Auctions
In this subsection we focus on symmetric unit auctions.40 We first define the environment.
Let ∆ = {(q1, q2, . . . , qN) ∈ RN+ :
∑n
i=1 qi ≤ 1} be the feasible allocations of a single
unit of a good to be auctioned off between N bidders.
A direct mechanism M for the auction with a fixed timeline T ∈ {A,B,C} is a
mapping
(q1, . . . , qN , t1, . . . , tN) : Θ→∆× Rn
giving as a function of reports for each agent the probability that she gets the good and
the payment to the auctioneer.
We make the classical assumption vi(q) = qi, i.e. the intrinsic value of the good of an
agent i is equal to the probability that the good ends up with agent i.
To ensure that there are no incentive compatibility issues as in subsection 3.2.1 we
add a parametric restriction for the news utility parameters to the classical regularity
assumption for the virtual valuation of the agents.
Assumption (A2)
• No Dominance of News Utility in the good dimension:
Λg = µg(λg − 1) ≤ 1.
• Regularity: The virtual valuation of F given by the function
γ(t) : [θ, θ¯]→R, γ(t) = t− 1−F (t)
f(t)
is strictly increasing.
The restriction for the aggregate news utility parameter ensures that no bidder shows
preference for a stochastically dominated allocation in the good dimension in timelines A
and B.41
Regularity corresponds to the classical assumption first introduced in [Myerson ’81].
It is fulfilled for many natural examples and allows for simple characterizations of the
optimal auction.42
Proposition 9. 1) Under Assumption (A2) the optimal allocation rule for timelines A,B
is the same as the Myersonian rule, that is, given θ∗ such that γ(θ∗) = 0 sell to any of
agents with the highest type θm = maxi≤n θi as long as θm ≥ θ∗.
2) Optimal auctions in timeline B are all-pay. That is, it is optimal to fully insure the
bidder against the uncertainty she is facing in the transfers.
3) Optimal auctions in timeline C are usually not all-pay. That is, it may be optimal
to not fully insure a positive measure of types against the uncertainty they are facing in
the money dimension. Moreover, the optimal threshold type is usually different from the
one in timelines A and B.
40The online appendix contains further results: optimal unit auctions for asymmetric agents in timeline
A as well as optimal symmetric auctions for timeline B. In both cases we show how news utility changes
results and intuitions from the classical setting.
41Recall the related discussion in [Masatlioglu, Raymond ’16]. This parameter restriction also appears
in other settings in the applied behavioral literature, such as [Herweg et al. ’10].
42For timelines A and B one could use the methods from [Toikka ’11] whenever Λg > 1. The model
here is separable according to the terminology in [Toikka ’11] (see section 3 of his paper).
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An indirect optimal auction is an auction with a reservation price and which follows
the respective timeline. In the case of timeline B it is additionally all-pay: each bidder
has to pay her bid. Bidders who would never bid above the reservation price bid zero and
pay zero.
Part 1) in the case of timeline A follows closely the standard classical proof for symmet-
ric unit auctions.43 The case of timeline B follows immediately from (the more general)
Proposition 6 in the online appendix.
Part 2) follows from the general all-pay result for timeline B which is proven in the
online appendix (see Theorem 1 there). A related result is known in the classical literature
on Expected Utility agents: optimal revenue maximizing auctions feature degenerate
transfers whenever an agent’s Bernoulli utility is separable in the consumption and money
dimension and the agent is risk averse w.r.t. money (see [Maskin, Riley ’84]).
In timeline C the auctioneer has an additional variable he can use to give incentives
for truth-telling in the reporting stage: the expected news utility terms in the money
dimension given by ω(θ). Its usage comes at a cost as ceteris paribus an ω(θ) > 0 lowers
the interim equilibrium utility in the reporting stage for type θ. Thus, when compared to
timeline A, timeline C besides the advantage that any expected payments are not shaded
down as in timeline A because of the missing surprise effect in the money dimension,
it has the additional advantage of having one more choice variable for the auctioneer.
Timeline A has the advantage of lacking the negative expected news utility term from the
realization effect, which implies that there is no need to subsidize individual rationality
as it is usually necessary in timeline C. We show numerically that in many parameter
constellations for timeline C the auctioneer decides to make use of ω(θ), i.e. leaves some
of the types with risk in the money dimension so as to help incentive compatibility in
the reporting stage. The next example illustrates this optimal distortion in the money
dimension.
Example 3. Consider an auction with two symmetric agents who satisfy the follow-
ing assumptions: λg = 1.2, µg = 1, µmλm = 1 and distribution of intrinsic type F =
uniform([1, 2]). Note that the lowest intrinsic type has strictly positive utility from
getting the good.
Figure 3.3 depicts the optimal distortion in the money dimension for the case of
timeline C.
Here, optimal fric is the following map as a function of types,
[1, 2] 3 θ→cmω(θ),
where cm =
λmµm
1+λmµm
Λm is a normalizing constant depending only on λm, µm. Note that
the distortion in the money dimension is decreasing and that there is no distortion at the
top.44
Another feature of optimal auctions in timeline C is that now the threshold type the
auctioneer uses to decide whether to sell the unit at all is different from the classical
43See e.g. chapter 3 of [Bo¨rgers ’15].
44The monotonicity in distortion is not a general feature as other numerical exercises show (available
upon request). For example, an inverse-U shaped distortion is possible if F = uniform([0, 1]): auctioneer
distorts only intermediate types in the money dimension. The no-distortion at the top property seems
to be fulfilled in many numerical examples.
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Figure 4: Friction in the money dimension as a function of type for Example 4.
Myerson one γ(θ∗). The auctioneer has to weigh different effects in timeline C: types have
to be subsidized for participating because of the wedge between incentive compatibility
and individual rationality and she has to decide which subset of types to fully insure in the
money dimension so as to maximize incentives of truthtelling after a positive participation
decision. As news utility parameters are varied but so as to keep Λg ≤ 1 satisfied, the
optimal balance of these effects may result for a fixed F fulfilling regularity in both a
higher or lower threshold than the classical threshold θ∗ (which satisfies γ(θ∗) = 0).
3.3.1 Timeline Optimality
In this subsection we assume the timeline is a choice variable of the auctioneer and consider
its optimality.
Theorem 2. 1) Timeline A always dominates timeline B in terms of revenue maximiza-
tion.
2) There is no uniform ranking of timelines A and C in terms of revenue maximization.
When compared to timeline A, timeline B features the same news utility effects except
for an additional negative realization effect coming from the negative expected news utility
in the good dimension. This lowers ceteris paribus for timeline B the willingness to pay
of a bidder so that timeline A is always preferred for revenue maximization.
The second part is proven by example.
Example 4. We take the same data as Example 4 with the only difference that now we
don’t fix µmλm but instead vary it in the interval [1, 2]. We look at timelines A,C.
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Figure 5: Auction revenues for timelines A (blue) and C (red) for friction in the money
dimension in the range [1, 2].
When µmλm is low the payments of the agent in timeline A are not shaded as much
due to the negative surprise effect in the money dimension. This, and the fact that
timeline C features a negative realization effect as well as a possible lump-sum subsidy for
participation yield optimality of timeline A whenever µmλm is low. When µmλm is high
the advantages of timeline C come to bear: there is no shading of payments due to the
negative surprise effect in the money dimension and there is an additional (albeit costly)
variable which can be used to give incentives in the reporting stage. While it is true
that individual rationality may need a lump-sum subsidy, the subsidy is on average small
because the lowest possible intrinsic type (θ = 1) loses a lot in terms of intrinsic utility in
case of non-participation, her outside option being zero overall utility. In fact, numerical
results available upon request show that the optimal timeline in this example is indeed A
if we change the distribution of intrinsic types in Example 4 to F = uniform([0, 1]).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have considered agents whose preferences are sensitive to changes of
beliefs and additionally feature loss aversion. Under the assumption that agents are
sophisticated about future behavior we have characterized features of optimal mechanism
design in two different models: one where a monopolist screens a single agent according to
their loss aversion parameter and one where multiple agents face uncertainty regarding the
intrinsic types of the other agents. This work can be extended along different directions.
For simplicity we have assumed that there is no discounting of time. This makes
two of the possible timelines equivalent for all purposes. Relaxing that assumption is a
fruitful didactic exercise as it would give a more complete picture for the characterization
of optimal timeline design.
A major assumption to relax in our model is sophistication. Allowing for naive or
partially naive agents in our setting will eventually lead to changes regarding timeline
optimality as well as changes in the features of optimal mechanisms. To see how, consider
timeline C and assume that the self who decides about participation assumes erroneously
that the self who decides about play will stick to her optimal plans. This will imply
that the participation-decision self will behave the same in timelines B and C. Knowing
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this, she won’t ask for a lump-sum subsidy in order to participate as was the case under
the sophistication assumption. Ceteris paribus this lowers the implementation costs for
timeline C for the designer. We conjecture that in the case of naive agents timeline C
becomes optimal in many more cases than it does in the case of sophisticated agents.
We haven’t considered the case where different agents may be in different timelines
or the case where the timeline is not common knowledge for all agents at the start of the
game. Moreover, we haven’t solved for the optimal timeline in the case of auctions with
asymmetric agents. These non-trivial extensions are left for future research.
Finally, a new strand of literature started by papers like [Rey, Salanie ’01] and [Maskin, Moore ’99]
considers designers who don’t have full commitment. Relaxing the full commitment as-
sumption in our setting is a very interesting topic left for future research.
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Appendices
A Auxiliary Results
A result on expected future news utility terms. Consider first a one dimensional
model. Here we skip the indices j = g,m for simplicity.
Whenever G is a degenerate distribution corresponding to getting r with probabil-
ity one, we write for the news utility term comparing the degenerate distribution to H
N (r|H). It holds
N (r|H) = Ez∼H [ξ(r − z)],
where ξ is a piecewise linear gain-loss valuation function as in (2). The expected news
utility from the realization of H is denoted by −ω(H) and it holds
ω(H) = Er∼H [N (r|H)].
The following technical Lemma is easy to prove.45
Lemma 1. It holds
ω(H) = Λ
∫ ∫
{z>w}
(z − w)dH(z)dH(w).
ω(H) is nonnegative and equal to zero if and only if H is a degenerate distribution.
Moreover, whenever H is supported in the non-negative numbers it holds
ω(H) ≤ ΛE[H].
45Note that a similar result has been proven in the CPE setting in [Eisenhuth ’17]. See Lemma 1 there.
Since the proof of our Lemma follows word-for-word his argument we skip it here.
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We have considered a model, where the uncertainty is one-dimensional. Given the
separability assumptions we make in Subsection 1.1 this result implies immediately the
proof of part 1) in Proposition 1.
Image of news utility terms as a function of distributions. The following is
a characterization for the image of the pair (ω(H),E[H]) as a function of the one-
dimensional distribution H.
Lemma 2. For every element (x, y) ∈ R+ × R there exists a binary distribution H =
L(p, b, d) = pδb + (1− p)δd with b ≥ d and p ∈ (0, 1) such that (ω(H),E[H]) = (x, y).
Proof. If x = 0 then just pick H = δy. So let’s focus on the case x > 0 which corresponds
to b > d. Then for a binary lottery, the system of equations we have to solve is{
d+ p(b− d) = y,
p(1− p)(b− d) = x.
But this is clearly solvable in p, b, d. Pick for example p = 1
2
, which leads to b =
y + 2x, d = y − 2x.
This Lemma shows that the designer in the multi-agent model can use loss aversion
in the money dimension to give additional incentives for truth-telling once the agents are
locked-in after a positive participation decision. Indeed, for a fixed agent i and type θi
in the auction model the distributions H correspond to the distributions on R generated
as an image distribution of ti(θi, θ−i) under the product measure FN−1(θ−i). Note that
because of our assumptions this measure has full-support on [θ, θ¯]N−1. It follows that
one can induce any Borel measure H which is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue
measure by appropriate choice of the (deterministic) payment functions ti. Note that the
expected news utility term ω here corresponds to M in the screening model which was
exogenously given there. In the multi-agent model ω becomes endogenous.
An abstract Incentive Compatibility characterization
Proposition 10. A direct mechanism M as in (9) is incentive compatible if and only if
the corresponding perceived valuations Wi are non-decreasing.
If this is the case, we have the following Mirrlees representation for the interim utility
in equilibrium Vi(θi) = Vi(θi|θi)
Vi(θi) = Vi(θi|θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Wi(s)ds. (16)
It also holds
Υi(θi) =Wi(θi)θi − Vi(θ)−
∫ θi
θi
Wi(s)ds. (17)
The proof is a trivial adaptation of the proof of the Mirrlees representation in the
classical quasilinear utility model. See [Bo¨rgers ’15] for the classical proof.
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B Proofs for Section 2
We start with the analysis for timeline B as that for timeline A is very similar, yet simpler.
Analysis for timeline C is more involved due to the wedge between individual rationality
and incentive compatibility.
B.0.1 Analysis for timeline B
Let U(s) = (1 + s)[ΓB(s)v(q(s))− t(s)] = (1 + s)W (s) be the utility of buyer of type s in
an incentive compatible mechanism. Then individual rationality is tantamount to
U(s) ≥ 0 equivalent to W (s) ≥ 0, λ¯ ≥ s ≥ 1.
Just as in the classical setting (see chapter 2 of [Bo¨rgers ’15]) one can show that W is
differentiable a.e. with
W ′(s) =
U ′(s)
1 + s
− U(s)
(1 + s)2
=
m−m−M
1 + s
v(q(s))− t(s)
1 + s
− −t(s) + Γ
B(s)v(q(s))
1 + s
= −2(m+M)v(q(s))
(1 + s)2
.
Here we have used the envelope theorem for the optimization problem of the agent. For
any incentive compatible mechanism it follows with the Mirrlees representation that
W (s)−W (λ¯) =
∫ s
λ¯
W ′(t)dt = 2(m+M)
∫ λ¯
s
v(q(t))
(1 + t)2
dt.
We can therefore write
t(s) = ΓB(s)v(q(s))− 2(m+M)
∫ λ¯
s
v(q(t))
(1 + t)2
dt−W (λ¯), λ0 ≥ s ≥ 1.
The fact that W is decreasing for any incentive compatible mechanism implies that indi-
vidual rationality is fulfilled if and only if W (λ¯) ≥ 0. An optimal mechanism will have
W (λ¯) = 0.
In all, the profit function is
Π =
∫ λ¯
1
[
ΓB(s)v(q(s))− 2(m+M)
∫ λ¯
s
v(q(t))
(1 + t)2
dt− cq(s)
]
G(ds).
The problem of the monopolist consists of maximizing this expression w.r.t.46 q non-
increasing. Doing the usual Fubini transformation for the double integral one gets
Π =
∫ λ¯
1
[
ΨB(s)v(q(s))− cq(s)]G(ds),
46‘w.r.t.’ means ‘with respect to’.
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with
ΨB(s) = ΓB(s)− 2(m+M) G(s)
(1 + s)2g(s)
.
ΨB(s) is the virtual valuation in this model. If it is non-increasing, then one can maximize
the integrand point-wise to get the optimal solution. In that case one can calculate the
FOC
µ [Ψ(s)v′(q(s))− c] = 0,
where µ is a Kuhn Tucker parameter, which is zero, as long as ΨB(s) ≤ 0 and otherwise
it is positive.
The corresponding assumption of regularity from the classical setting (see [Myerson ’81]
or [Bo¨rgers ’15]) is the following.
Regularity for timeline B 47
4m+ 7M
2(m+M)
≥ G(λ)
g(λ)
[
2
1 + λ
+
g′(λ)
g(λ)
]
, λ ∈ [1, λ¯]. (18)
If Ψ is not non-increasing, then one can use ironing techniques from [Toikka ’11] to
solve for bunching. Conditions in his paper are fulfilled since the model here is separable
according to his terminology (see section 3 of his paper).
B.0.2 Analysis for timeline A
The calculations for timeline A are virtually the same as for timeline B, except that the
terms involving M are missing because there is no realization effect in timeline A. The
formal analysis is word-for-word the same as in timeline B except that now we have to
set M = 0 everywhere in the calculations.
In particular, the regularity assumption for timeline A doesn’t depend on the features
of the distribution of intrinsic values F .
Regularity for timeline A
2 ≥ G(λ)
g(λ)
[
2
1 + λ
+
g′(λ)
g(λ)
]
, λ ∈ [1, λ¯].
Finding the optimal mechanism proceeds the same way as for timeline B.
B.0.3 Analysis for timeline C
Proof of Proposition 4, Part 1. Step 0. Assume in this preliminary step that the
growth condition on v implies that
|x− y| ≤ const|v(x)p − v(y)p|,
where const in the following will be a non-specified positive constant number which may
change from line to line and always so that the respective inequality holds. It follows then
that
|v−1(x)− v−1(y)| ≤ c|xp − yp|.
47This just corresponds to the derivative of ψB being non-positive.
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This in turn implies that the functional
Lp([1, λ¯]) 3 f→
∫ λ¯
1
v−1(f(s))ds (19)
is continuous in the Lp-norm. The simple argument for this uses the fact that the function
[0,∞) 3 x→x 1p is Ho¨lder continuous with exponent 1
p
.
Proof of |x − y| ≤ const|v(x)p − v(y)p| This follows simply by Taylor’s expansion of
order one applied to x→v(x)p and the growth condition on v.
Step 1. Since the virtual type ΓC(λ) = m + (1 − λ)M is decreasing in λ, just as for the
timeline B, it follows
Incentive compatibility is equivalent to q(·) non-decreasing.
By Mirrlees representation of the optimal payments for this situation, payments t(λ)
which ensure incentive compatibility are given up to a constant by the incentive compat-
ibility requirement of the decision-play self who has already decided to participate in the
mechanism. We denote by U(λ) the play-decision utility in equilibrium of an incentive
compatible mechanism (this is determined in the second period). It is given by
U(λ) = ΓC(λ)v(q(λ))− t(λ).
The envelope theorem from the maximization problem of the agent gives
U ′(λ) = −Mv(q(λ)).
We can use this to write
U(λ) = ΓC(λ)v(q(λ))− t(λ) = U(1)−M
∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds.
We solve for t(λ) to write for a constant f = −U(1) ∈ R.
t(λ) = f + ΓC(λ)v(q(λ)) +M
∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds. (20)
Fact: t(·) is weakly decreasing in any incentive compatible mechanism.
This can be easily established through taking (one-sided) derivatives. The calculation
uses Assumption (S) extensively.
The Fact has an important implication for the optimal mechanism whenever it exists:
t(λ) ≥ 0 always in any optimal mechanism for timeline C. Proof of this implication is
through contradiction. Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that there is an incentive
compatible and individually rational mechanism which is profit-optimal for timeline C
and so that t(λ0) < 0 for some λ0. The Fact implies that t(λ) < 0 for every λ ≥ λ0. But
then the monopolist can switch to (q(λ), t(λ)) = (0, 0) for all λ ≥ λ0 (i.e. exclude all types
with λ ≥ λ0). This preserves incentive compatibility and also individual rationality as
the former is equivalent to q non-increasing (which remains intact) and the latter depends
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only on the own type.48 Thus there is a threshold type λˆ ∈ [1, λ¯] so that the monopolist
sets (q(λ), t(λ)) = (0, 0) whenever λ > λˆ.
Step 2. The proof of this step doesn’t need the growth condition on v. Assume in this
step that the threshold type λˆ is already given. As one can see easily, the arguments of
this step hold the same for every particular value λˆ ∈ (1, λ¯].
Given the t(λ) ≥ 0 - property for any optimal mechanism, at the participation stage
(before the first delay), if the agent of type λ accepts the mechanism the agent experiences
the following utility (see also discussion in main text):
V (λ) = [(2m+ (1− λ)M ] v(q(λ))− (1 + λ)t(λ),
or using the definitions from timeline B
V (λ) = (1 + λ)ΓB(λ)v(q(λ))− (1 + λ)t(λ). (21)
Replacing (20) into (21) we get
V (λ) = (1 + λ)
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))− (1 + λ)f − (1 + λ)M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds.
It follows that the individual rationality requirement can be written as
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))− f −M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds ≥ 0, λ ∈ [1, λˆ].
The objective function of the designer becomes
∫ λˆ
1
t(s)− cq(s)dG(s) = f ·G(λˆ) +
∫ λˆ
1
[
ΓC(λ)v(q(λ)) +M
∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds
]
− cq(s)dG(λ).
(22)
After the usual application of Fubini’s Theorem this expression turns into
f ·G(λˆ) +
∫ λˆ
1
{[
ΓC(λ) +M
G(λˆ)−G(λ)
g(λ)
]
v(q(λ))− cq(λ)
}
dG(λ).
Thus the problem of the designer for timeline C can be rewritten as follows
max
f∈R,s 7→q(s)
f ·G(λˆ) +
∫ λˆ
1
{[
ΓC(λ) +M
G(λˆ)−G(λ)
g(λ)
]
v(q(λ))− cq(λ)
}
dG(λ)
s.t.
(1) q(s) is non-increasing,
(2)
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] v(q(λ))− f −M ∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds ≥ 0, λ ∈ [1, λˆ].
(23)
48Thus, types outside [λ0, λ¯] retain individual rationality under the changed mechanism and types in
[λ0, λ¯] are excluded from the mechanism and thus get their outside option of zero utility.
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But note that by taking f in (22) into the integral49 and replacing the constraint (2)
we get an upper bound for the profit. Namely, the maximum of the following integral∫ λˆ
1
ΓB(λ)v(q(λ))− cq(λ)dG(λ), (24)
with respect to all non-increasing q. This program is easily solvable through point-wise
maximization given our constraints.50 In in all we have an upper bound for the program
in (8). The point-wise maximum of (24) has the following property:
(!) ∞ > q(λ) > 0 whenever ΓB(λ) > 0 and q(λ) = 0 otherwise. This means the
problem in (24) has a finite value.
In particular, it is not optimal in (24) to set q so that lim supλ→1+ q(λ) = +∞, i.e.
q is not locally unbounded near 1. That would only be profitable if the optimized
value in (8) were infinity, which contradicts (!). This implies that v(q(λ)), λ ∈ [1, λˆ]
remains bounded for any potential solution of (8).
Moreover, it is easy to see from (8) and (!) that
(!!) f is bounded and finite in any potential optimum.
Introduce now for a given nondecreasing q(·)
u(λ) = f +M
∫ λ
1
v(q(s))ds. (25)
This results in u being continuous, non-decreasing and concave, but with free endpoint
u(1) = f . Moreover, for every u non-decreasing and concave there exists a non-increasing
q(·) and a f ∈ R such that u can be expressed as in (25). We make use of this equivalence
considerably in what follows.
Inserting (25) in (22) we get that each feasible allocation q(·) for the program (8)
results in a feasible ‘allocation’ u(·) for the following maximization program.
max
s 7→u(s)
∫ λˆ
1
{
ΓC(λ)
u′(λ)
M
+ u(λ)− cv−1(u′(λ))
}
dG(λ)
s.t.
(1) u(s) is continuous, non-decreasing, concave
(2)
[
ΓB(λ)− ΓC(λ)] u′(λ)
M
− u(λ) ≥ 0, a.e. λ ∈ [1, λˆ].
(26)
The other direction is also trivially true: whenever we have a solution u to (26) we get
a solution to (23) by the relations q(s) = v−1
(
u′(s)
M
)
, t(s) = u(s) + ΓC(s)u
′(s)
M
for s ≤ λˆ
and q(s) = 0, t(s) = 0 otherwise. Note that it is w.l.o.g. to ask for constraint (2) to hold
a.e. This is because G is absolutely continuous w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure on [1, λ¯].
49f ·G(λˆ) = ∫ λˆ
1
fdG(λ).
50Recall that g is bounded away from zero on [1, λ¯].
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Because of (!) and (!!) we can assume that u′(1) and u(1) are bounded for all feasible
candidates of (26). In combination with constraint (1) in (26) (continuity and concavity)
this implies that we can restrict the class of u in the maximization in (26) by requiring
additionally the following condition.51
(3) functions u are bounded in the Sobolev p-norm: u 7→
(∫ λˆ
1
|u(λ)|pdλ+ ∫ λˆ
1
|u′(λ)|pdλ
) 1
p
by a constant c > 0. Here recall that p > 1. The constant c is chosen to be independent of
λˆ given its boundedness and the upper and lower bounds for the optimal profit of timeline
C. Moreover they are also bounded in the essential supremum-norm by a uniform bound
holding for all u under consideration.
Denote by C(λˆ) the class of functions satisfying (1), (2), (3) where (1) and (2) are only
required to hold almost everywhere.
Note then the easy-to-show but important facts: C(λˆ) is convex and bounded in the
Sobolev-p norm. This follows from the linearity of the two constraints and of the Sobolev
norm, as well as the requirement (3).
C(λˆ) is closed in the Sobolev-p norm.52 To show this assume that we have a sequence
un, n ≥ 1 which satisfy (1), (2), (3) and which converge in Sobolev-p norm to u. Then
that (2), (3) hold true for u is easy to check: convergence in Lp implies convergence of a
suitable subsequence a.e.; this implies that u is non-decreasing and concave [1, λˆ] which
means that it is also continuous in (1, λˆ); (1), (2) are then automatically fulfilled; (3) is
fulfilled due to the definition of convergence in the Sobolev-p norm.
Since C(λˆ) is closed and bounded it is sequentially compact in the weak topology
induced by Sobolev p-norm. This is because the space of Sobolev functions equipped
with the Sobolev p-norm is reflexive and one can apply the Banach-Alaoglu Theorem
which implies sequential compactness w.r.t. weak topology for all bounded, closed sets.53
The functional being maximized has the form
J(u) =
∫ λˆ
1
L(λ, u(λ), u′(λ))dλ
with L(λ, u, w) = g(λ)
(
ΓC(λ) w
M
+ u− cv−1(w)) for (λ, u, w) coming from a bounded set
of R3 (determined by the above discussion) and otherwise flattens to zero continuously
for all (λ, u, w) outside this bounded set. L is then a continuous function and satisfies
L(λ, u, w) ≤ a(λ)w + b(λ) + c|u|,
with some bounded functions a, b > 0. Finally, w 7→ L(λ, u, w) is strictly concave since
v−1 is strictly convex. By Theorem 3.23, pg. 96 in [Dacorogna ’08] it follows that J is
sequential upper semi-continuous w.r.t. the weak topology.
Because of upper-semicontinuity of J and compactness of the set C(λˆ) (all in the
same topology), we know that maximizing J over C(λˆ) has a solution. The solution is
a Sobolev function, i.e. it can be chosen to be continuous everywhere and differentiable
almost everywhere.
51u′ is bounded from below by monotonicity. If it were optimal to have lim sups→1 u
′(s) = +∞ we
would get a contradiction to (!) since u′(s) = Mv(q(s)).
52Note that there is a natural continuous and onto embedding ι(λˆ, λˆ′) : C(λˆ′)→C(λˆ) whenever λˆ ≤ λˆ′.
It is given by restricting the definition domain of the functions.
53See e.g. section 3.15 of [Rudin ’91].
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Step 2. We now show how to calculate the optimal λˆ ∈ [1, λ¯]. For this, it suffices
to show that the value function of the maximization problem (26) is continuous w.r.t.
λˆ ∈ [1, λ¯].
Note that [1, λ¯] 3 λˆ→C(λˆ) is a continuous, compact-valued correspondence in λˆ. Here
we are considering all C(λˆ) embedded in the ‘largest’ space C(λ¯), all equipped with the
Sobolev-p norm. Upper hemicontinuity follows by checking directly its sequential char-
acterization. Lower hemicontinuity follows just as easily because of the continuous and
onto embedding ι(λˆ, λˆ′) : C(λˆ′)→C(λˆ) introduced in footnote 52. Finally, note that the
objective functional in (26) is jointly continuous in (λˆ, u) where [1, λ¯]×(Sobolev−p)([1, λ¯])
is equipped with the product topology of the euclidean one and the one of the Sobolev-p
norm. This follows because of the Ho¨lder inequality combined with the continuity of the
map in (19).
Proof of Proposition 4, part 2). This follows from the fact that ΓB(λ) − ΓC(λ) =
1−λ
1+λ
(m−λM). ΓB(λ)−ΓC(λ) is zero for λ = 1 and negative for all small λ > 1. It follows
from the second constraint in (8) that f ≤ 0 in any optimal menu of contracts. If it were
true that q(1) = 0 then it would follow that q ≡ 0, i.e. the profit would be zero. Thus,
whenever the profit is not zero it means that for some range near λ = 1 the monopolist
offers positive amounts of the good. It follows that f < 0 must hold.
Proof of Theorem 1. That A is weakly better than B follows directly from the fact
that the virtual valuation ΨA in timeline A is pointwise higher than the virtual valuation
ΨB in timeline B and that otherwise the set of incentive compatible and individually
rational mechanisms is the same for both timelines.
That B is weakly better than C follows from Proposition 4. Namely, we show there
during the existence proof for timeline C that:
- the profit in timeline C is always bounded by the profit in timeline B, leaving out the
individual rationality requirement in timeline B (proof of part 1 of Proposition 4). The
optimal IC mechanism in timeline B is automatically IR.
- Individual rationality in timeline C weakly costs something positive to the monopolist
whenever profits in C are strictly positive (part 2) of Proposition 4).
C Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 5. Straightforward algebra calculations show the formulas for (6)
hold for both the case when vi(∅) is the minimum and the case when it is the maximum
of vi with the definitions made in the main text. We have just split payments ti(θi, ·) into
the range where it is strictly positive and the range where it is negative. The positive
range is multiplied by λmi . A similar split is done for the good dimension, but now it is
the negative range which is multiplied by λgi . One uses Lemma 1 and algebra. The same
steps can be made for the terms ωi.
Proof of Proposition 6. Here we use Proposition 10 in a first step which ensures the
existence of the perceived payments.
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The proof is finished if we show the existence of the payment schedules ti for fixed Υi-s
delivered by the proof in the classical setting. Some ti-s that do the trick are the following:
set first ti(θi, θ−i) = ti(θi, θ′−i),∀θi, θ−i, θ′−i. This implies Ti(θ) = ti(θ, θ−i),∀θ, θ−i and
T+i (θ) = ti(θ, θ−i)1{ti(θ,θ−i)≥0} = Ti(θ)1{Ti(θ)≥0}. Then, ωi(θ) = 0. If Υi(θ) = 0 then
set Ti(θ) = 0, otherwise if Υi(θ) > 0 set Ti(θ) =
Υi(θ)
1+λmi µ
m
i
, while if Υi(θ) < 0 then set
Ti(θ) =
Υi(θ)
1+µmi
. Note that Ti(θ) are increasing in Υ(θi), albeit with a discontinuity at
zero. This finishes the proof, since the Mirrlees representation also follows by the same
arguments as in the classical proof with quasilinear utilities. In general, if one wants a
mechanism with non-trivial ωi-s one uses Lemma 2. In timeline B, where the T
+
i terms
matter, we show in the online appendix that for optimal mechanisms it holds ωi ≡ 0. It
follows that optimal mechanisms in all of our applications below will have ti ≥ 0, so that
T+i = Ti.
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Proof of Proposition 8. In the following we suppress the timeline superscript whenever
the argument is valid for all timelines or it is clear from the proof context to which timeline
the statements correspond.
1)-2) The case of timeline A is clear from the discussion in text. We show the result
for timeline B. The proof for timeline C is similar.
First note that q being symmetric we can write Qi(θ) = Q(θ) and thus Wi = W
for each i. Moreover, q being monotone increasing in each θi, the same follows for Q.
Indeed, we have Q(θ) = 1 − F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N) − θ). Taking W as a function of Q, i.e.
W(Q) = (1 + µg)Q− ΛgQ(1−Q) we have
dW
dQ
= 1 + µg − Λg + 2ΛgQ.
This derivative is always nonnegative for Λg ≤ 1 + µg, which establishes 1).
For Λg > 1 + µg, substituting the formula for Q into the derivative above, we see that
W is nondecreasing if and only if
1
2
(
1 + µg + Λg
Λg
) ≥ F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N)− θ) for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. (27)
The left hand side of (27) is smaller than 1, if the premise of 2) is fulfilled. Also the
condition is more likely to be violated as c˜(N) approaches θ and as F becomes more and
more concentrated in lower θ-s. Note also that the upper bound on the left of (27) is
smaller the higher Λg is. This establishes 2).
3) Note first the bound F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N)− θ) ≤ F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N)− θ), which is uniform
in θ. We can write
F ∗(N−1)(Nc˜(N)− θ) = P(
∑N−1
i=1 θi
N − 1 ≤
Nc˜(N)− θ
N − 1 )
Now we only need to note that due to the Strong Law of Large Numbers 55 we know that∑N−1
i=1 θi
N−1 converges almost surely to E[F ]. Meanwhile,
Nc˜(N)
N−1 has possible limit points all
strictly smaller than E[F ] due to assumption. Thus we have that as N →∞ the left hand
side of (27) converges to zero uniformly in θ.
54For timelines A and C this is clear from Proposition 5.
55See for example chapter 2 of [Durrett ’10].
40
Proof of Theorem 2, 1). We know the rule for the optimal direct mechanism reads
‘give the good to the bidder i with the highest θi, as long as θi > θ
∗’. Individual rationality
is realized in both timelines by setting the utility of the lowest types in equilibrium equal
to zero. Recalling that in both cases the revenue in the optimal mechanism is given by
N∑
i=1
∫ θ¯
θ
WA/Bi (θi)γ(θi)dF (θi),
one sees that the fact WAi (θi) ≥ WBi (θi), together with the fact that in both cases the
optimal allocation rules prescribe WA/Bi (θi) = 0, whenever θi < θ∗, the result follows.
Analysis for timeline C in the case of symmetric auctions. We assume through-
out i.i.d. intrinsic types and that Λg ≤ 1.
Given this, the symmetric equilibrium of any incentive compatible auction has a
threshold type: sell to the highest type above a threshold. This follows from Propo-
sition 6 and the fact that it is without loss of generality to look at symmetric allocation
rules. The reason for the latter is the same as in classical setting (see footnote 11 in
[Maskin, Riley ’84]). It follows for incentive compatible allocation rules that the expected
probability of getting the good when own type is s has the following form.
Q(s) = F (s)n−11{s≥θˆ}.
Given this, we can then build the perceived valuation
W(s) = Q(s)(1− Λg(1−Q(s))),
as well as define the auxiliary functions
h(s) =W(s)s−
∫ s
θ
W(t)dt.
Define furthermore
g(s) =W(s)s+ µgQ(s)s.
Note that g and h depend on the threshold θˆ. They are both zero below θˆ. Moreover,
both functions are weakly increasing due to IC and the assumption that Λg ≤ 1. Denote
in the following by c the decision utility of the agent with the lowest type θ.
Claim. An incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism in the timeline
C is a tuple (θˆ, ω, c) s.t.
(IC) c+ Λmω(s) + T (s) = h(s), s ≥ θˆ
(IR) c ≥ sm,θˆ(s)−
λmµm
1 + λmµm
Λmω(s), s ≥ θˆ
where sm,θˆ(s) = h(s)− 11+λmµm g(s).
Proof of Claim. These follow directly by using Propositions 6 and 7. (IC) is immediate
whereas the individual rationality requirement can be written first as
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g(θ) ≥ (1 + λmµm)T (θ) + Λmω(θ), s ≥ θˆ (28)
which is then easily manipulated into (IR).
Note that (IC) together with Assumption (A2) implies that Λmω(s)+T (s) is increasing
in s. Thus, types with s < θˆ don’t get served at all and pay nothing whereas types s ≥ θˆ
may receive a (net) subsidy of c.
sm,θˆ is a piece-wise smooth function with at most one discontinuity of uniformly
bounded size across all incentive compatible mechanisms.56
Due to symmetry and the above we can rewrite the maximization problem of the
designer as
max
c∈R,(T,ω):Θi→R×R+
∫ θ¯
θ
T (θ)dF (θ), s.t. (IC) and (IR) ∀θ.
The objective function of the problem for timeline C is∫ θ¯
θˆ
h(t)dF (t)−
∫ θ¯
θ
(c+ Λmω(s))dF (s).
We can split the maximization problem in two parts. Once a threshold θˆ has been
chosen, the rest of the mechanism is found by solving
min
c,ω(·)≥0
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(c+ Λmω(s))dF (s),
under the constraint
(IR) c ≥ sm,θˆ(s)−
λmµm
1 + λmµm
Λmω(s), s ≥ θˆ.
Given any c, one can see that the optimal ω has to satisfy
Λmω(s) =
1 + λmµm
λmµm
max{sm,θˆ(s)− c, 0}, s ≥ θˆ
Note that payments are degenerate for all types (all-pay) if and only if c ≥ maxs sm,θˆ(s).
Otherwise, the optimal mechanism is not all-pay and some of the types will not be fully
insured in the money dimension.
Overall, given a threshold type θˆ the rest of the mechanism is determined by solving
min
c∈R
1 + λmµm
λmµm
∫ θ¯
θˆ
max{sm,θˆ(s)−
1
1 + λmµm
c,
λmµm
1 + λmµm
c}dF (s)−F (θˆ) max{− 1
λmµm
c, c}
Note that the presence of the last term in the minimization problem will usually make
for a non-smooth solution as one varies the parameter λmµm. Nevertheless, the value
function of this minimization problem is a continuous function of θˆ.57 Denote the value
function of this problem by H(θˆ). The optimal threshold then solves
56It is increasing in the money friction λmµm. Its difference to h disappears uniformly as λmµm→∞.
57The conditions for Berge’s maximum theorem are given because c can be taken to be bounded without
loss of generality, whenever λmµm comes from a bounded interval.
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max
θˆ∈[θ,θ¯]
∫ θ¯
θˆ
h(t)dF (t)−H(θˆ).
The maximand is a continuous function being maximized over a compact interval. There-
fore there always exists a solution so that the discussion above implies that there always
exists an optimal auction for timeline C.
Optimal Timelines Given that timeline B is never optimal the comparison is between
timelines A and C.
Recall that the revenue from one auction participant in timeline A is
1 + µg
1 + λmµm
∫ θ¯
θ
(
Q(s)s−
∫ s
0
Q(t)dt
)
dF (t) =
1 + µg
1 + λmµm
∫ 1
θ∗
Q(s)γ(s)ds
Here, θ∗ satisfies γ(θ∗) = 0. The recipe for the optimal revenue in the case of timeline C
is given in the preceding paragraph.
The rest of the work for the examples is numerical analysis using the software package
R.
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